PROTECTING CIVILIANS

KEY DETERMINANTS IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE

A Report by
the Ford Institute for Human Security
PROTECTING CIVILIANS

KEY DETERMINANTS IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE

Principle Investigator
Professor Simon Reich

Editorial Director
Jeff Whitehead

Senior Research Associate
Penelope Nelson

Geographic Information
Systems Graphics:
Kathryn Collins
Cathleen Marcks

Student Research Associates
Daniel S. Carik
Megan Carniewski
Pamela S. Daley
Christopher P. Farnsworth
Owen Foley
Rebecca M. Johnson
Joumana King
Danielle Loustau-Williams
Corey Mercedes Sczechowicz
Alexandra J. Taylor

© 2009 by Ford Institute for Human Security

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help:

- Prevent and resolve violent international conflicts
- Promote post-conflict stability and development
- Increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide

The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.

GSPIA
University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

The Graduate School of Public and International Affairs strives to prepare students to make substantive contributions to society through careers as managers, advisors, and policy analysts in government and nonprofit organizations in a multitude of geographic locations throughout the world.

To accomplish these goals, GSPIA teaches, conducts research and performs public service in the following areas:
- Management and administration of public and nonprofit agencies
- Growth and sustainable development of urban metropolitan regions throughout the world
- Economic and social development of newly independent and developing states
- Emerging dynamics that are shaping today’s international political economy
- Threats to and issues in international security

Through dedication to quality teaching that builds skills and commitments to the core values, GSPIA students work to improve public and nonprofit organizations that contribute to free and just societies in the United States and abroad.
About the Ford Institute:

The Ford Institute for Human Security was established in 2003 at the University of Pittsburgh as a nonprofit organization dedicated to the principle of independent empirical research to form a bridge between the academic and policymaking communities. It has been made possible through a generous endowment made by the Ford Motor Company. The Ford Institute’s work focuses on violent threats to civilian populations. By bringing together global and diverse teams of experts, the Ford Institute is committed to identifying and studying issues concerning internal and transnational threats to the human rights of civilian populations. Among those issues are:

- Genocide
- Forced and slave labor
- Corporate social responsibility and human development
- Intra-state conflict and human rights
- Internal displacement, forced migration, and refugees
- Environmental security and public health

Based on its research, the Ford Institute generates and disseminates policy papers and advocates nonpartisan policy proposals. It makes its findings available to national and international policymakers, non-governmental organizations, corporations and other interested organizations.

The Ford Institute is a constituent component of the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, an affiliate of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and the University Center for International Studies at the University of Pittsburgh.

This report is based upon research supported by the United States Institute of Peace, under the grant number 404366, entitled, “What Makes a Camp Safe? The Protection of Civilians in IDP and Refugee Camps.” The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace. For more information about the United States Institute of Peace, go to: www.usip.org.

For more information on this project, go to: www.fordinstitute.pitt.edu.
EXE CU TIVE SUMMARY

Events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan in 2008 have once again drawn attention to the role of peacekeeping missions in African conflicts. Furthermore, at the beginning of 2009, the prospect of introducing such a force in Somalia has become an increasingly distinct possibility. In general, such operations often elicit fervent debates within the foreign policy community, standing at the intersection of moral, legal, and national interests. Stung in part by criticism of their activities, the United Nations (UN) crafted the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, designed to address a series of current questions regarding the utility of peacekeeping missions. In view of the criticism of these missions’ purported incapacity to protect civilians from attack, the Ford Institute launched this study, intent on analyzing both the reasons why they often prove ineffectual and, correspondingly, the conditions under which they can prove to be more effective. In an attempt to explain why some peacekeeping missions are better able to protect civilians than others, the Ford Institute therefore sought to identify the underlying conditions that must be satisfied in order for a peacekeeping operation to fulfill its mandate and prevent violence against internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. This document reports those findings.

Funding from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP Grant Number 114-07F) allowed the Ford Institute to conduct the third phase of a study devoted to civilian protection in African conflicts entitled, Protecting Civilians: Key Determinants in the Effectiveness of a Peacekeeping Force. At the conclusion of the first and second phases, the Ford Institute identified factors that had a direct impact on IDP and refugee camp security. In building upon these efforts, this current third phase examines the role that peacekeepers play in mitigating violence, preventing attacks on camps, and protecting civilians more generally.

In researching this phase, the Ford Institute expanded its database to examine eight current or recent African countries in conflict, examining 16 factors with a potential impact on the protection of civilians in the armed conflicts. The cases studied consisted of Angola (1999-2002), Burundi (1993-2006), Chad (2004-), Sudan (2004)-1, the DRC (1997-), Liberia (1989-1997, 1999-2003), Sierra Leone (1994-2001), and Uganda (1995)-2. For each conflict, Ford Institute researchers identified the location of IDP and refugee camps, recorded the population of these camps for the duration of the conflict, and analyzed data pertaining to each incidence of violence against civilians — including any attacks on or near camps. As in the second phase of its study, Ford Institute researchers utilized geographic information systems (GIS) software to produce a series of maps that both chart the migration of civilian populations and locate attacks on camps. The Ford Institute hopes that its database, GIS mapping, and the findings of this report will contribute to the international community’s efforts to craft policy that will enhance civilian protection through the efforts of peacekeeping forces.

The findings of the study suggest that peacekeeping operations may be critical to the reduction of violence and attacks against civilians, particularly those living in IDP and refugee camps. While the size of a force and the expanse of area inevitably plays a role in mitigating violence, the research identified four other factors that play a crucial role in determining a peacekeeping operation’s effectiveness in preventing attacks, consisting of the following:

- The timing of the introduction of a United Nations peacekeeping force.
- A United Nations peacekeeping mission’s ability to effectively patrol volatile borders.
- A United Nations peacekeeping mission’s ability to initiate and implement disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation (DDR) programs.

In sum, the results of this phase of the project indicate that peacekeeping missions are often undermanned relative to the number of civilians and size of the area that they have to protect; they are introduced too late into a conflict situation; and are too reliant on regionally trained forces. Furthermore, they lack the necessary mandate and resources to implement demobilization programs effectively or to secure borders that would help stop the spread of violence into neighboring states.

Conversely, the Ford Institute has found that:

- A critical relationship exists between the ratio of internally displaced persons per peacekeeper and the geographic size of a country per peacekeeper. Therefore, when the ratio of internally displaced persons and refugees per peacekeeper is relatively low, that force has generally been able to mitigate violence against civilians.
- Peacekeeping forces with a lower ratio of square kilometers per peacekeeper to patrol were also more effective in preventing violence than those with higher ratios.
- Peacekeepers should be introduced earlier in a conflict than is customarily the case, so as to prevent violence against civilians, as opposed to simply functioning to protect those already impacted by it.
- A strong relationship seemingly exists between a force’s composition and its ability to protect civilians. Consistently, across the cases examined, peacekeeping forces with larger contributions of troops from fewer countries, a lower turnover of personnel, and comprised with a cross-regional balance were best able to protect civilians from violence as measured in terms of the number of recorded attacks.
- The policymaking community should address the incapacity of peacekeepers to both monitor and secure borders. Too often, unsecured borders ensure that violent attacks follow refugee flows across borders, expanding the zone of conflict and ensuring that civilians cannot benefit from any safe havens.
- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs, under the right conditions, may act as a key component in breaking the cycle of recurrent violence. Although often unsuccessful in achieving this goal, their prospects are enhanced when a peacekeeping force is mandated to implement such a program.

2 Although the conflict ended in 2006, Ford Institute researchers found documented attacks on camps in Burundi in 2007.
3 Ford Institute researchers recognize that there was a conflict in Sudan in 2002. For this report, the institute is focusing on the conflict from 2004 onward.
4 For the purpose of reporting, Ford Institute researchers have used data on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and Uganda through July 2008.
WHEN ARE PEACEKEEPERS USEFUL IN PROTECTING CIVILIANS?

In the current debate over the utility of UN peacekeeping operations in the protection of civilians, supporters such as former United States Senator Tim Wirth assert that, “Together, we can spread the message that UN peacekeeping is essential. Without it, the world would be a much less stable, and more violent, place.” However, scholars and politicians continually question the utility of UN peacekeeping operations, as illustrated by Canadian Senator Romeo Dallaire in his statement that “the concept of peacekeeping has failed in this era.”

Demonstrably, the demand for peacekeepers worldwide has risen sharply in the last two decades. In response to the increased demand for peacekeepers, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) released a manual in 2008 entitled United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. Utilizing lessons learned from recent missions, this report sketches the foundations for the construction and implementation of UN peacekeeping operations including:

- Consent of the parties to a conflict, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense and in defense of the mandate.
- Local and international legitimation and credibility.
- Effective communication with local authorities and the populace.
- A structure that should be derived from an in-depth appreciation of the specific country setting and an honest assessment of the UN capacities to respond effectively. The force structure should be driven by a coherent strategy for a country and the resources available to the UN.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the research conducted by the Ford Institute for this study identified three main issues that potentially undermine UN peacekeeping operations:

- Specifications of a mandate are often inconsistent with the challenges that a peacekeeping force faces on the ground.
- Insufficient munitions, equipment, and logistical support to fulfill the requirements of missions.
- Insufficient numbers and training of personnel.

These critiques of UN PKOs have become particularly cogent given the recent upsurge in violence in the DRC and the inability of the UN mission, MONUC, to protect civilians. In its November 2008 report, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict stated that, “the outbreak of renewed fighting in North Kivu and parts of Oriental province, notably in [the] Ituri district and Dungu territory, in September and October 2008 has led to a resurgence of incidents of violations against children. This is posing serious challenges for the implementation of the reform of the security sector and the comprehensive strategy for stability and security.”

In 2000, given the UN’s failures in Bosnia and Rwanda, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned a high-level group of experts to assess the UN system’s shortcomings and provide candid, pragmatic recommendations for change. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly called the Brahimi Report, offered an in-depth critique of the conduct of UN operations. The report asserted that vague mandates coupled with overly optimistic assessments of the situation on the ground led to inadequate deployments with unclear objectives. Furthermore, mandates too often exceeded the resources available, creating a gap between expectations and actual mission capabilities. The report urged the UN Secretariat to specify both the resources and procedures for missions operating in a conflict zone, including the importance of reporting potential operation gaps between mandates and capacity to the Security Council. The panel further stressed that many complex operations require the will to use force if necessary when stating that, “Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers.”

UN critics Ramesh Thakur and David Malone (2000) have also called for, “clear mandates and goals, matching military and financial resources.” James Fearon and David Laitin (2004) have gone further in arguing that the UN routinely underfunds and inadequately staffs missions in order to avoid casualties. Part of this dynamic, they suggest, is that the Secretary General has often “undersold mission requirements” in an effort to convince the Security Council to mandate the commission of peacekeeping operations in situations where the Security Council would otherwise have been reluctant to intervene.

Consistent with this claim, for example, a July 2008 report by the Darfur Consortium found that underfunding had a severe impact on the UNAMID mission in Darfur. It stated that, “The force lacks critical resources, leaving the people of Darfur, humanitarian agencies and even its own peacekeepers vulnerable to ongoing attacks and extreme violence.”

A litany of claims, critics have suggested that deployed troops have generally been ill-equipped and have lacked sufficient language and/or cultural training. The UN has purportedly also been unable to provide skilled personnel for
training and management purposes. Peacekeepers are therefore poorly trained to deal with the underlying causes of conflict, such as severe inequalities, trauma among victims, and the antecedents of political and ethnic strife. In the absence of a clearly defined national interest, Thakur and Malone assert that “member states, which have the best means to provide well-trained, fully equipped, and disciplined troops, lack the political will to do so; those with the will lack the military and logistical capacity.” Additionally, the image of the UN has been severely tarnished not only by claims of severe abuse by peacekeepers, but also by its inability to respond quickly and effectively to these events.

Despite these criticisms, the demand for peacekeeping operations remains constant, implying that they have continued utility in protecting civilians. For instance, peacekeepers are reputedly adaptive to new circumstances. Furthermore, such missions can provide a cost-effective option for dealing with conflict. This is especially true in instances where they break the cycle of civil strife. The UN, for example, has been instrumental in reducing violence against civilians and re-establishing security in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and East Timor.

John Hughes (2000) argues that peacekeeping missions are most useful when they serve as the arbiter between factions that have already agreed to a peace accord. In such an environment, peacekeepers largely serve as the guarantors of security. Even in such cases, this role is complicated when more than two warring factions are present, as is the case in most current African conflicts. The conflict in Darfur illustrates this limitation well; the 2006 Dakar Accord proved ineffective in protecting civilians from violence. Such situations require recognition by all sides that they have fought to a stalemate; in Darfur only one faction of the Sudanese Liberation Army agreed to the peace talks while the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and other rebel groups either boycotted or were explicitly excluded from participating in negotiations.

Finally, Jennifer Hazen argues that peacekeepers can function successfully as an instrument in stabilizing countries by preparing the foundation for peacebuilding initiatives. Thakur and Malone adopt a similar position, asserting that peacekeepers should engage in actions that promote the rule of law and economic recovery through policing, institution-building, reconstruction, and administration. While true, however, none of these functions spare civilians from the worst excesses of violence often endemic to the early stages of conflicts.

“The need for creating clear mandates and goals, matching military and financial resources, and establishing performance benchmarks has long been recognized but rarely followed.”

—David Malone

BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

This report constitutes the findings of the third phase of the Ford Institute’s study on the prevention of attacks against civilians in African conflicts. The first phase, a pilot study, was funded by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in early 2007. Ford Institute researchers then compiled limited background information and data on IDP and refugee camps based on a representational sample from eight conflicts in seven African countries. The findings of this initial phase indicated that a symbolic peacekeeping force was insufficient to protect civilians in camps; and that a weak force may lead to greater propensity for violence, abduction, or symbolic victories for insurgent forces.

The second phase of the project, also funded by DFAIT, expanded upon the initial sample by including data on 1,503 documented attacks on IDP and refugee camps in eight African conflicts. These data were coded and catalogued by Ford Institute researchers for analysis across 27 different factors. Throughout the course of the second phase of the project, Ford Institute researchers sought to analyze child abductions in IDP and refugee camps in an effort to develop a more complete understanding of why camps are targeted and how to protect them. Geographic information systems (GIS) software allowed the Ford Institute to track not only the statistical significance of each of their 27 factors, but also to track trends such as the flight of IDPs and refugees and their access to water. The crucial findings of the second phase of the project included the following:

- A positive correlation exists between the duration of a conflict and the likelihood of violence directed against civilians.
- Conflict zones, particularly those close to international borders, are fluid and dynamic, requiring a mechanism for monitoring and securitizing IDP and refugee populations.
- Protected camps are less likely to be attacked than unprotected camps, and international peacekeepers are more likely to provide effective protection than host government forces.

Based on the findings of the second phase, the Ford Institute embarked on the third phase of the project with a focus on the role of international peacekeepers. Funded by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Ford Institute researchers discarded eleven previously studied factors as not relevant, reducing the list to 16 (Appendix) in order to determine the conditions under which peacekeeping forces are able to enhance civilian safety from attacks, notably in IDP and refugee camps. Ford Institute researchers collected data from a wide variety of documented sources such as the United Nations, international aid organizations and NGOs. As in the previous two phases, data proved challenging to collect as legitimate sources may fail to report threats against security or an inability to operate in a host country. Non-reporting of data regarding civilian attacks and peacekeeping operations was also more challenging for missions that occurred prior to the introduction of the internet as a tool for the dissemination of information.

In this study, the Ford Institute developed two measures to assess the effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission:

- A decrease in the number of attacks on IDP and refugee camps.
- A decrease in the size of the total displaced population.

In order to determine which factors have had an impact on a peacekeeping force’s ability to protect civilians from attack, Ford Institute researchers first surveyed the current scholarly and policy-related thinking on peacekeeping operations. They then analyzed characteristics of a peacekeeping operation — such as mandate and composition — and operational facets such as an ability to regulate borders and implement DDR programs. By coding data and utilizing GIS software, researchers at the Ford Institute were able to study each factor individually and in relation to a peacekeeping operation’s overall ability to protect civilians from attack.

The study was thus able to amass and code copious amounts of data in a systematic form, examining peacekeeping operations across eight African conflicts. The principle objective of the project was to dissect each peacekeeping force to determine which characteristics contributed to the overall safety of the civilians that it was designed to protect and which, if any, impaired it from doing so. The results are intended to assist in the foundation of new operational procedures, force structure, mission size, and areas of responsibility.

30 The main finding from this phase of the project is that large, unprotected camps are the most attractive targets for child abductions and belligerents. Additional findings from this initial phase of research can be found in “What Makes A Camp Safe?” available at www.fordinstitute.pitt.edu/docs/23182ReportPR11.pdf.

The Ford Institute recognizes that the dynamic interaction of social, political, and economic forces is unique to each conflict. A purely qualitative analysis is of restricted utility for policymakers in terms of generating useful generalizations. Researchers therefore examined three quantitative relationships between peacekeeping operations and countries to which they were deployed in order to determine the relationship between the size of a peacekeeping force and its ability to protect civilians:

- The total displaced population as a percentage of the total population of a nation in conflict.
- The ratio of peacekeeping personnel to the total displaced population housed in a nation in conflict.
- The ratio of peacekeeping personnel to the geographic size of the nation or region in conflict.

The total displaced population of a conflict nation was measured as the sum of all displaced persons living within the borders of a country subject to protection by a peacekeeping mission, calculated using figures from United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC).[^32] The resulting ratio listed in Table 2 therefore offers one measure of the relative severity of conflict within a country.[^33] The Ford Institute fully recognizes that size of a conflict zone in which peacekeeping forces operate vary considerably. Four of the conflicts examined are regional (Chad, the DRC, Sudan, and Uganda) while the other four (Angola, Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) are national in scope. Nonetheless, the significant variance demonstrates the differing challenges faced by peacekeepers in protecting civilians.

Table 1 lists the ratio of the total displaced population living in each respective country as a percentage of the total population of that country.[^34] From these data it is possible to distinguish three distinct trends. First, the number of displaced persons as a percentage of the total population has consistently decreased over time in Angola, Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone, countries in which a UN peacekeeping operation has been active. Second, the number of displaced persons as a percentage of the total population has consistently increased in Chad, where no comprehensive peacekeeping force exists. Finally, there is a relatively constant percentage of displaced persons as a function of the total population in the DRC, Sudan, and Uganda. The DRC and Sudan are among the largest UN peacekeeping operations in the world while Uganda does not host a UN peacekeeping operation at all. Given these percentages, the mere presence of a UN peacekeeping operation therefore cannot be considered a determinative factor when assessing the severity or intractability of the numbers of displaced persons.

### Table 1. Proportion of Displaced Persons to the Total Population (% By Year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>8.47</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>9.43</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>17.03</td>
<td>14.45</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>11.19</td>
<td>15.02</td>
<td>13.50</td>
<td>13.50</td>
<td>15.48</td>
<td>13.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>6.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2. Ratio of Peacekeepers to the Total Displaced Population (By Year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Displaced Population per Peacekeeper</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>4280.4</td>
<td>35830.8</td>
<td>4280.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>471.5</td>
<td>233.5</td>
<td>115.4</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>2225.9</td>
<td>726.3</td>
<td>537.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2686.4</td>
<td>590.1</td>
<td>555.6</td>
<td>280.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^32]: Please see Framing the Research on page 9.
[^33]: Although the presence of refugees indicates that violence has occurred in neighboring states, their numbers are counted here because they are nonetheless subject to protection by peacekeepers.
Table 2 details the ratio of the total displaced population housed in a country divided by the number of peacekeepers deployed to that country on a yearly basis. A smaller ratio is generally preferable, signifying that there are fewer displaced persons per peacekeeper. Nonetheless, these ratios are not particularly useful on their own and should not be viewed as determinative in isolation from the context of the situation on the ground. For instance, while the ratio of total displaced to peacekeepers increased in Sierra Leone between 2003 and 2008, this development was due to a reduction in violence—a draw down in the peacekeeping mission due to increased stability. In contrast, the ratio of total displaced persons per peacekeeper has decreased substantially in the DRC, yet the security situation in the DRC is again worsening, as the recent events around both the city of Goma and in Doruma has made evident.

Table 3. Ratio of Peacekeepers to Geographic Area to Patrol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Area per Peacekeeper</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>96861.5</td>
<td>11242.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>322.6</td>
<td>205.9</td>
<td>140.3</td>
<td>127.4</td>
<td>123.4</td>
<td>123.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>2652.6</td>
<td>1884.7</td>
<td>2238.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1147.8</td>
<td>251.8</td>
<td>216.5</td>
<td>125.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* No peacekeepers deployed

The ratio of total displaced population to peacekeepers serves as one proxy indicator of the capacity of a peacekeeping force to provide security for vulnerable civilians. While each peacekeeper in Sudan was responsible for guarding 280.34 people in 2008, each peacekeeper in the DRC was responsible for 88.63 displaced persons that same year. It is useful to compare these figures to the vastly different ones found in Liberia in 2005 (5.43 displaced per peacekeeper) and Sierra Leone in 2003 (5.07 displaced per peacekeeper)—both being cases where stability has been restored.

While the data does not support the contention that such reduced ratios are a sufficient condition for reduced violence, they do provide circumstantial evidence of a short-term correlation between greater proportions of peacekeepers and reduced incidence of violence.

The ratios listed in Table 2 indicated the number of displaced civilians for which each peacekeeper is theoretically responsible. The ratio of land area per peacekeeper, as detailed in Table 3, however, signifies the number of square kilometers for which each peacekeeper is theoretically responsible. Of course, this ratio is not actually indicative of how peacekeepers are stationed in a conflict zone. Furthermore, we recognize that not all conflicts are national in character, often being highly regionalized within countries. Nevertheless, this ratio gives a relative approximation of how large an area for which a peacekeeping mission may be required to provide security and therefore how dense the coverage of the peacekeeping mission may be. It also may have an impact on the geostrategic concerns peacekeepers may face in dealing with hostile forces: the larger the area for belligerents to hide, the greater the geostrategic challenge.

Two distinct trends emerge from this data. First, the ratio of land area per peacekeeper in Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone during pivotal years in conflict and societal reconciliation were comparable, averaging approximately 8.63 square kilometers per peacekeeper during heavy periods of violence.

“Peacekeeping has been pushed to the wall,” said Bruce Jones. “There is a sense across the system that this is a mess—overburdened, underfunded, overstretched.”


---

35 The number of peacekeepers for a given year is the average of those deployed in a country over a twelve-month period. For data see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/.
37 The figures for Sierra Leone (2006-2008) were omitted from this calculation because the peacekeeping mission had largely drawn down with the completion of its mandate by 2006.
These conflicts have largely been stabilized. Second, the ratio of land area per peacekeeper in Sudan and the DRC is significantly greater, largely due to the fact that these two countries are geographically larger in size than Burundi, Liberia, or Sierra Leone with no comparable increase in the size of the peacekeeping force. The average ratio of land area to peacekeeper for the DRC and Sudan during relevant years was 181.85, or nearly 25 times greater than the average in Burundi, Liberia or Sierra Leone.

The difference in the cessation of violence between Liberia and the DRC may, however, partly be explained by noting another ratio; that of the land area of the country per peacekeeper. Chart 1 plots both ratios together, reflecting a commonality in one area and an important discrepancy in another. Although Liberia in 2003 and the DRC in 2008 had a similar ratio of displaced population per peacekeeper, the UN missions were responsible for widely disparate ratios of land area per peacekeeper. The MONUC mission in the DRC had to fulfill its duties over a much larger geographic area than its counterpart in Liberia. The MONUC mission is, in effect, less dense – possibly explaining their decreased ability to provide protection for civilians.

When viewed in isolation, none of these three ratios (the proportion of the population that is displaced, the proportion of peacekeepers to displaced persons and the proportion of peacekeepers to land density) are intrinsically illuminating. However, when combined, they provide a base level—a quantifiable context—with which to begin a more detailed examination of human security conditions in African civil conflicts.

**DOES IT MEASURE UP?**

An illuminating comparison can be made between Darfur and France that highlights the precarious security environment. News outlets and humanitarian groups routinely compare the geographic area of Darfur with that of France in order to illustrate the approximate scale of the Sudanese conflict. The security forces of France are divided approximately evenly between the Police Nationale and Gendarmes, with a combined total of 224,571 uniformed personnel protecting a population of over 64 million. In comparison there were 12,442 uniformed UNAMID personnel present in Darfur at the end of 2008, protecting a population of slightly over 6 million. Theoretically, each French policeman or Gendarme is tasked with providing day-to-day security for 285.25 civilians, while the national armed forces additionally protect France from external threats. In comparison, the uniformed UNAMID personnel are each theoretically responsible for 495.1 Darfuri civilians.

Furthermore, unlike in France, the Sudanese Armed Forces are belligerents in the conflict – supporting and collaborating with the Janjaweed militias. Effectively, UNAMID is being asked to do far more, with far less, in a challenging geopolitical environment.

---

38 The figure for Sudan in 2005 was not included in the calculation due to the fact that the mission was implemented mid-year.

39 Figure for the Gendarmes from, “Personnels de la gendarmerie nationale,” available, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/gendarmerie/descouvertes/moyens/efforts/repartition/repartition_des_effectifs.

Figure for the Police Nationale from the Ministère de l’Intérieur, available, http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/.
This data set is the source of analysis for the section, Ratios Do Matter. The data for attacks was compiled by Ford Institute researchers from open source documents. The ratio of Total Displaced/Total Population was calculated by taking the sum of the total number of Internally Displaced Persons and the total number of Refugees within a country, and then dividing by the population of that country. IDP statistics are sourced from research conducted by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Refugee statistics are sourced from the annual “World Refugee Survey” published by the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. Total population statistics are sourced from the CIA World Factbook. The number used to calculate the ratios involving peacekeepers is the mean of the monthly deployment figures listed by the United Nations.

### Table 4. Framing the Research Ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Displaced/Total Population</td>
<td>9.43%</td>
<td>3.40%</td>
<td>2.79%</td>
<td>1.74%</td>
<td>1.43%</td>
<td>1.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Displaced/Peacekeepers</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area/Peacekeepers</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Displaced/Total Population</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>1.64%</td>
<td>2.65%</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
<td>4.71%</td>
<td>4.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Displaced/Peacekeepers</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>35830.8</td>
<td>4280.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area/Peacekeepers</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>96861.5</td>
<td>11242.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Displaced/Total Population</td>
<td>5.90%</td>
<td>4.41%</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
<td>2.08%</td>
<td>2.45%</td>
<td>3.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Displaced/Peacekeepers</td>
<td>471.5</td>
<td>233.5</td>
<td>115.4</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area/Peacekeepers</td>
<td>322.6</td>
<td>205.9</td>
<td>140.3</td>
<td>127.4</td>
<td>123.4</td>
<td>123.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Displaced/Total Population</td>
<td>17.03%</td>
<td>14.45%</td>
<td>2.49%</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
<td>0.82%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Displaced/Peacekeepers</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area/Peacekeepers</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Displaced/Total Population</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
<td>1.19%</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Displaced/Peacekeepers</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>2225.9</td>
<td>726.3</td>
<td>537.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area/Peacekeepers</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>2652.6</td>
<td>1884.7</td>
<td>2238.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Displaced/Total Population</td>
<td>11.19%</td>
<td>15.02%</td>
<td>13.50%</td>
<td>13.50%</td>
<td>15.48%</td>
<td>13.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Displaced/Peacekeepers</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2686.4</td>
<td>590.1</td>
<td>555.6</td>
<td>280.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area/Peacekeepers</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1147.8</td>
<td>251.8</td>
<td>216.5</td>
<td>125.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data is unavailable
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The size of a force clearly matters in terms of civilian protection, as does the numbers it is asked to protect and area that it has to patrol. These are unsurprising and thus not included in the major findings section of the report.

Beyond that, however, the Ford Institute for Human Security’s findings strongly suggest that, under specific conditions, an appropriately mandated and staffed peacekeeping force may significantly contribute to the protection of civilians in conflict zones. According to the United Nations, a successful peacekeeping mission is one that tailor its mandate and capabilities to the circumstances and requirements of the situation.\(^4^0\) All UN Peacekeeping missions have formal mandates that legally define their duties and obligations. Peacekeeping mandates fall under either Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. A Chapter VI UN mandate is associated with traditional methods of resolving conflict without the use of force, such as mediation, negotiation, conciliation and fact-finding. It does not expressly call for the physical protection of civilians. In contrast, a Chapter VII mandate authorizes the use of coercive measures, including, but not limited to, sanctions, embargos, and, if necessary, military intervention. A Chapter VII mandate may specifically authorize the use of force to protect civilians.\(^4^1\) While a mandate is intended to clearly define the role of the mission, its implementation is inevitably dependent upon the interpretation and enforcement of each force commander as well as the context of each conflict.

While a mandate is an essential foundation for any peacekeeping operation, it does not guarantee a reduction in the level of violence against civilians. Ford Institute researchers identified four key factors that influence the ability of a peacekeeping force to protect African civilians in armed conflicts:

- The timing of the introduction of a peacekeeping force.
- The composition of a force – fundamentally its distribution between African and non-African personnel.
- A mission’s ability to effectively patrol volatile borders.
- A mission’s ability to implement and oversee DDR programs.

I. Timing

Research conducted by the Ford Institute suggests that the timing of the introduction of a peacekeeping mission may play an important role in mitigating violence against civilians.

In order to analyze how the timing of a mission influences the pattern of violence against civilians, the Ford Institute analyzed cases that deployed peacekeepers in early, peak, and post conflict phases. Graphs 1 through 3 reflect these different phases, with the number of attacks on IDP and refugee camps shown in brown and the number of peacekeepers shown in tan. Graph 1 illustrates that MONUC forces in the DRC were deployed in the early phase of the conflict. Graph 2 depicts the case of Sierra Leone, where the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeepers were introduced at the height of the conflict. Finally, Graph 3 shows that United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB) forces were deployed as the conflict wound down.

The DRC case (Graph 1) suggests that a correlation existed between the initial introduction of troops and the number of recorded attacks. A steep decline was recorded in 2000 when troops first arrived. After resurgent numbers of attacks between 2001 and 2003, the number of the MONUC force grew and attacks again declined. However, as the number of attacks escalated after 2004, the density problems discussed in the prior section ensured that MONUC forces were unable to protect the vulnerable civilian population in the enlarged conflict zone. In response, the number of MONUC forces steadily increased and this continued expansion of troop numbers between 2003 and 2006 was again consistent with an eventual decline in attacks. In effect, troop deployment played a “catch up game” with the expanded zone of conflict. The incremental commitment of forces may have had a short-term effect on the number of attacks before the zone expanded and violence resumed. The lesson of this case is that an early, non-incremental introduction of troops may have mitigated the pattern of violence and thus saved lives.

The aggregate data illustrated in the case of Sierra Leone (Graph 2) reinforces the finding – that a timely introduction may be important - in a different and more emphatic manner. Here, UN forces were introduced in the midst of the conflict – but in far greater numbers proportionate to the civilian population. In the absence of a peacekeeping force, as Graph 2 shows, attacks on IDP camps continued to increase between 1997 and 1999. Then, in 2000, UNAMSIL was deployed under a Chapter VII mandate authorizing the protection of civilians.\(^4^2\) The evidence suggests that the timely deployment of UNAMSIL helped to steadily reduce attacks on camps, which ceased altogether by 2001. Although introduced into the conflict zone later than in the DRC, the lesson of this example is that overwhelming force does make a difference.

Graph 3 depicts the case of the ONUB force deployment in Burundi, with attacks on camps increasing and decreasing in a cyclical pattern before troops arrived in 2004. Although UN forces were deployed in overwhelming numbers, they only did so as the conflict wound down. Clearly, this case does not provide prima facie evidence that troop deployment resulted in a decline in attacks against civilians. It may, however, substantiate the counterfactual claim that their presence may have helped mitigate resurgent violence against the civilian population - ONUB helped to stabilize Burundi and played an instrumental role in the reconstruction process.\(^4^3\) Likewise, in the case of Liberia, the UNMIL peacekeeping force was de-

\(^{40}\) United Nations, supra note 1.

\(^{41}\) For more information on the UN Charter or Chapters VI and VII, please see: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.


ployed after the majority of violence had been carried out against civilians, and while UNMIL played a vital role in Liberia’s rebuilding process, there is no clear evidence that it prevented attacks on camps.\textsuperscript{44}

The evidence drawn from these cases yields a potentially important conclusion. The introduction of a peacekeeping force has been consistently viewed as being helpful in mitigating violence. In the clearest case, of Sierra Leone, the arrival of an ‘overwhelming military force’ stemmed the tide of violence midstream. In the DRC it may have mitigated such violence. In Burundi it may conceivably have dampened resurgent violence.

Based on these three cases, however, the findings support the proposition that early intervention in proportionate numbers has a significant influence in reducing the number of attacks on civilians.

**II. Composition**

Prompted in part by the problems encountered in protecting civilians by the all-African force in Darfur, researchers at the Ford Institute examined the issue of the composition of peacekeeping forces in five African conflicts in an effort to determine whether it influences their effectiveness in protecting civilians from attack. These data suggest that a peacekeeping force’s composition does influence its ability to protect civilians from violence. Of particular significance is:

- The greater relative percentage of the top five contributors as a proportion of the entire peacekeeping force.
- The relative balance of these five contributing nations between African and non-African states.
- The relative consistency of those top five states as contributors over time.

The majority of the peacekeepers deployed to each of the missions for which appropriate data was available consisted of forces from five principal contributing countries. Map 1 lists the missions studied as well as the top five troop-contributors to each force. For ONUB and UNAMSIL, 90 and 80 percent of their forces came from the top five contributing countries respectively. Conversely, the UNAMID (69 percent) and MONUC (54 percent) missions, the least effective of the missions in terms of protecting civilians, had the lowest percentage contribution from the five largest contributing countries. These figures support the preliminary finding that there may be a relationship between the concentration of contributing countries to a force and its ability to protect civilians: a more homogenous force may be more effective than a more heterogeneous one.

\textsuperscript{44} Although not discussed in depth in this report, further research by the Ford Institute suggests that peacekeeping operations may serve some utility in post conflict rehabilitation and societal reconstruction, even if they are deployed only during the latter phase of a conflict.
Data also suggest that cross-regional balance may play a key role in a mission’s ability to protect civilians. South Asian troops composed well over 30 percent of the force for all the missions studied, excluding UNAMID. In the case of the ONUB and UNAMSIL, South Asian troops represented 41 and 44 percent of the top five contributing countries respectively. African troops contributed over 30 percent to the top five contributing countries in each of the missions examined with the exception of the DRC. In Darfur, the five major contributing countries for the UNAMID force are all from sub-Saharan Africa, comprising 69 percent of the total force. As evidence cited earlier indicates, ONUB and UNAMSIL were better able to quell attacks on civilians. This research supports the claim that coupling regional African experience with troops from a different region may add to a force’s effectiveness in protecting civilians from attack. While the empirical data collected regarding these five missions suggests that African troops alone are less able to halt attacks on civilians than when they are coupled with troops from outside the region, it is beyond the scope of this paper to explain why. Data collected by the Ford Institute shows no significant difference between the amounts spent per peacekeeper by African contributors compared to other countries.

Finally, in addition to a peacekeeping mission’s composition and cross-regional balance, these data support the contention that the stability of a force matters: when the turnover within a peacekeeping force is nominal over periods of six months or more, attacks on IDPs decrease. Evidence drawn from the data suggest that there is a connection between the continued presence of these same five forces and reduced violence. While individual peacekeepers may be replaced, the countries providing the peacekeepers over that period should not change – reflecting a consistent command and management structure. Even in Sudan, the UNAMID mission in Darfur that commenced in December 2007 sustained a four-month period.

Map 1: Conflicts and Top Five Contributing Countries

---

1 This force structure differs due to the refusal of the Sudanese government to allow non-African peacekeepers. Appropriate data for the troop composition of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), however, was unavailable.
of relatively stable force composition, corresponding with a decrease in attacks on civilians -- as reflected in Graph 4. A subsequent period of turnover coincided with a spike in violence.

Particularly problematic in terms of troop turnover has been the case of the DRC. MONUC’s force distribution has changed significantly over its eight-year mission. As reflected in Chart 2, MONUC’s troop composition and stability can be distinguished into two periods, between 2001 and 2004, and between 2005 and the present. As Chart 2 demonstrates, both the percentage of the top five and the composition of the top five have radically changed over time. During the first phase of the conflict (between 2001 and 2004), the top five contributing countries composed 58 percent of the overall mission force. In the current phase, the top five contributing countries provided 69 percent of the troops to the total mission -- a larger percentage but one still lower than other missions, such as ONUB and UNAMSIL. Indeed, using a shorter timescale, during this first phase --

between January 2003 and October 2003 - the composition of the top five contributing countries to MONUC changed on a monthly basis, at which time fourteen attacks were reported. Conversely, between November 2003 and October 2004, an eleven-month period of relative troop stability, attacks on IDPs decreased by more than 50 percent.

Since 2005, India and Pakistan have jointly contributed an average of 44 percent of all peacekeeping forces to MONUC. Furthermore, since 2006, troop stability has remained more consistent than in the prior phase. This increase in South Asian troops coupled with a relatively greater degree of troop stability correlated with a 75 percent decrease in attacks on IDPs between the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2008. Given the recent upsurge in violence in the DRC, one critical question concerns whether the 3,000 additional peacekeeping troops sanctioned by the UN in November 2008 - if deployed - will be drawn from the current top five contributors and enhance a regional/non-regional balance.

---

Graph 4: Reported Attacks in Darfur

Chart 2. Percent Contribution of Top Five Contributing Countries to Each ‘Phase’ of MONUC

---

47 In late October 2008, IDP and refugee camps sheltering nearly 50,000 people outside of Goma in eastern DRC were destroyed. See: "DR Congo Refugee Camps Burned" http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7702009.stm.
III. Peacekeeping Forces and Border Control

From the American southwest to the West Bank, border security is recognized as a fundamental imperative of state security. Governments may go to great lengths in attempting to ensure that they can control who, and what, crosses their borders at any given place and time. Complete border security is virtually impossible, even for advanced, affluent countries such as the United States. In the African conflicts examined in this study, porous, unsecured borders represent a significant source of insecurity and act as a particularly important factor in amplifying the degree of violence targeted at vulnerable civilian populations. The majority of African governments fail to adequately secure their borders because they are unable and/or unwilling to do so. Moreover, historically, UN peacekeeping operations have been restricted to a single nation state. The mandate of each mission is beholden to an imaginary line on the map and therefore limits the mission’s ability to provide security for civilians.

The Ford Institute recognizes that border security is of vital importance for the protection of IDP and refugee populations. An examination of each mandate for the seven African peacekeeping operations for language specific to border security shows considerable variation. The mandates for UNAVEM III (Angola), MINURCAT (Chad), UNMIL (Liberia), and UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) do not contain provisions for border security operations. Although the MINURCAT mandate specifies that the mission “liaise with the Chadian Government and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in support of their efforts to relocate refugee camps which are in close proximity to the border, and to provide to UNHCR, on availability and cost-reimbursable basis, logistical assistance for that purpose,” MINURCAT is at heart an observation mission with limited combat capability.

By way of comparison, the mandates for UNAMID (Darfur), MONUC (DRC), and ONUB (Burundi) contain language that specifically tasks these peacekeeping operations with maintaining and/or reestablishing border security. The Ford Institute undertook a detailed analysis of human security conditions in these three states in an effort to better understand the relationship between peacekeeping operations, border security, and the protection of vulnerable civilian populations.

The ONUB mandate contains a number of provisions that explicitly pertain to border security. Specifically, the ONUB mandate compelled the peacekeeping mission to monitor and prevent the free movement of small arms across the Burundian/DRC border. Further, the Security Council tasked ONUB with both protecting refugees as they crossed the border and with preventing armed combatants from crossing the border. The Secretary General was also asked to conclude agreements with neighboring states allowing ONUB forces to cross into their territories when in pursuit of militants. Though not evident in any other mandate examined, the Ford Institute finds this provision to be especially important for the protection of civilian populations. An important commonality between the MONUC and ONUB mandates is that each specifically calls upon the two peacekeeping operations to coordinate their efforts along the common Burundian/DRC border. However, neither mandate includes a call for diplomatic efforts to attain transit authority for the pursuit of militants across the border. Although the Burundi region is still considered unstable, the ONUB mission, unlike the MONUC mission in the DRC, entered the conflict, helped restore peace, and left within a relatively short period of time.

Map 2 illustrates the importance of coordinating border security efforts in regions plagued with violence directed against civilian populations. The eastern border of the DRC has been an area of severe instability for over a decade. Ford Institute researchers have cataloged attacks against civilian populations in the DRC, Burundi, and Uganda for the eight year period between 2000 and 2008. The majority of all violent incidents occurred within 50 km of either side of the border, highlighting the ease with which militants have had transit. Violence had declined in Burundi prior to the deployment of ONUB in 2003. Within two years of the initial deployment of peacekeepers, attacks on civilians had completely ceased. Although it is impossible to quantify the degree to which coordination of border security between ONUB and MONUC contributed to this decline, the Ford Institute believes that any effort to reduce the movement of small arms and combatants constitutes a net gain in security. In effect, border security and human security are positively correlated in this context.

Elsewhere, the UNAMID mission to Darfur is mandated to “monitor and report on the security situation at the Sudan’s borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.” A principle recommendation in a report issued by the Secretary General concerning the peacekeeping operation in Darfur was that UNAMID must enhance the security of the Sudanese borders with Chad and Central African Republic. Yet, at present, the UNAMID operation is staffed at 66 percent of its mandated strength and is therefore unlikely to have the capacity to maintain border security.

---

Map 2. Attacks in Burundi, the DRC, and Uganda from 2000-2008
The recommendation of the Security Council’s report was not coincidental. Cross-border violence has become a defining characteristic of the conflict in Darfur. As the conflict has endured, it has become anchored to the destabilized, unsecured border region. The Ford Institute has compiled a database of refugee & IDP camps and attacks on civilians in Darfur and eastern Chad for the years 2003-2008. Map 3 tracks the progression of violence over a four-year period, 2004 and 2008. Beginning in 2004, the majority of attacks and violent incidents involving civilian populations occurred well within the borders of Sudan. The red line indicates the center of violence in terms of attacks recorded during each given year. In 2004, the center of violence was approximately 283 kilometers from the Sudanese border with Chad. The center of attacks subsequently shifted westward, indicating that a greater percentage of violence was occurring in the vicinity of the border and within Chad itself. By 2008, the center of violence moved significantly closer to the Chad/Sudan border. In fact, the center of violence was approximately 94 kilometers from the Chad/Sudan border. In 2004, slightly less than four percent of all attacks on civilians in the region occurred on the Chadian side of the border. By 2008, the percentage of attacks occurring in Chad increased to 33.3 percent. From 2004 to 2008, the center of violence therefore shifted closer to the Chad/Sudan border, moving approximately 200 kilometers East during the four year span.

The prevalence of cross-border violence, along with a near absence of border control and security are hallmarks of the security environment in both the Great Lakes region and Greater Darfur. Combatants and criminal actors thrive in the security vacuums of the border regions. The case of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is indicative of this phenomenon. Efforts by Ugandan security forces to stamp out the LRA have consistently been stymied by the latter’s ability to cross into southern Sudan and/or northeastern DRC. The recent successful joint operation by Congolese, Sudanese, and Ugandan security forces to isolate the main LRA base may well stand as a model for future operations designed to improve human security conditions in border regions. The potential advantages of a greater focus on border security have already been realized in at least one case. The arrest of rebel general Laurent Nkunda by Rwandan authorities suggests that the governments of DRC and Rwanda may have concluded that their internal security is in large part dependent upon the security of their common border. General Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi, crossed the border into Rwanda while fleeing from a joint Congolese-Rwandan operation intended to apprehend him. The

---

52 While the Ford Institute and many other organizations recognize that attacks are occurring, due to a law enacted by the Government of Sudan in February of 2006, reporting of attacks and other problems encountered by NGOs operating in Sudan have been restricted. Aid organizations that do not follow the law can be expelled from Sudan. For more information, see: Human Rights Watch Darfur: Humanitarian Aid under siege, May 2006. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/05/08/darfur-humanitarian-aid-under-siege.
involvement of Rwandan security forces in this operation is a stark departure from the previous position of the Rwandan Government, which supported Nkunda for several years.55

The only realistic approach to curbing the prevalence of cross-border violence is to address the security vacuum which so often prevails in border regions, and within which the drivers of conflict and violence thrive. Policy makers may find that it is better to conceptualize borders as a filter, rather than a barrier, striving to find a filter through which IDPs and refugees may pass.

IV. The Role of Peacekeepers in the Implementation of DDR Programs

Of the seven current UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, five include elements of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programming in their mandates.56 DDR programs are often regarded as playing a potentially important strategic role in consolidating an end to violence against civilians and enhancing the rule of law.57 While the role of peacekeepers in the evaluation, monitoring, and implementation of DDR programs may differ according to the conflict, as a tactic in the context of strategic peacekeeping, DDR programs can be a vital link between peacemaking and peacebuilding by facilitating an immediate reduction in the level of violence.

The case of Sierra Leone aptly demonstrates both the potential significance of DDR programs and the role that peacekeepers can contribute to such programs as reflected in Graph 5.

The UNAMSIL mission in Sierra Leone commencing at the end of 1999 included a mandate that provided for the oversight and implementation of a Joint Operation Plan to implement a DDR program involving several agencies including the Government of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG). When violence resumed in May of 2000, the DDR program was halted until combined efforts later that year led to the reimplementation of the DDR process. This last phase of the DDR program, beginning in May of 2001, was characterized by an increased commitment to the peace process by all armed groups. Over the ensuing three-year period, the program proved effective in contributing to the curbing of violence against civilians. UNAMSIL’s role included providing security, establishing reception centers and weapons storage centers, implementing screening and registration and providing resources for relocation and family reunification. The program eventually disarmed and demobilized 71,043 combatants.58 Sierra Leone correspondingly experienced a rapid decline in attacks on civilians. Graph 5 depicts this inverse trend between the number of demobilized combatants and the reduction of violence against civilian populations. While the decline in attacks cannot wholly be explained by the introduction of a DDR program, the fact that a program was initiated – providing an institutional mechanism for a cessation in hostilities – clearly contributed to this decline in violence against civilians.

As a result, DDR programs have become a common component of UN missions.

While the example of Sierra Leone may demonstrate the potential of a DDR program that is integrated into a UN peacekeeping mission, the successful implementation of a DDR process is undoubtedly complicated and highly dependent on context. In contrast, due to the immense diversity of actors that is characteristic of the conflict, DDR programs in the DRC have varied in their effectiveness by region. The Ford Institute recognizes thus that under certain circumstances, DDR programs can have a complementary role in the peacebuilding process and should, therefore, be implemented by peacekeeping operations when possible and pertinent.

Graph 5. Demobilized Combatants vs. Attacks on Camps in Sierra Leone

* Demobilized Combatants within the UNAMSIL supported DDR program.
While UN missions sometimes take responsibility for implementing DDR programs, national governments have implemented successful national programs in the absence of UN support. Although the conflict is ongoing, Uganda provides a significant example of the latter. Indeed, despite having suffered almost continually from violent conflict since 1986, the only UN peacekeeping force to have been stationed there was the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) in 1993 and 1994. Its mandate was confined to monitoring the border between Rwanda and Uganda to ensure that no arms passed between the two states. Since UNOMUR’s withdrawal in 1994, Uganda has attempted to address its internal security problems without the aid of the international community.

Uganda has unilaterally implemented two DDR programs, the first of which resulted in the demobilization and reintegration of 36,358 combatants of the National Resistance Army between 1992 and 1995. The second DDR program in Uganda was enacted under the Amnesty Act of 2000. The main provisions of the Amnesty Act included the granting of amnesty to all combatants who surrendered their weapons, the establishment of a Demobilization and Resettlement Team (DRT), and the establishment of the Amnesty Commission. The Ugandan Peoples’ Defense Forces (UPDF) was given primary responsibility for “receiving reporters” under the auspices of the DRT. The government of Uganda assumed responsibility for organizing and disarming former combatants with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies assisting in the reintegration programs. By the end of 2006, approximately 21,000 combatants were granted amnesty, 16,133 were demobilized, and the majority were reintegrated into civilian life. Approximately 19,000 weapons were recovered from combatants, many of which were subsequently destroyed. By 2007 there was only one documented camp attack, although the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) still remained intact and continued to launch attacks on civilian targets. This example suggests that while UN forces can ably assist in the implementation of DDR programs, programs carried out by national governments can achieve comparable goals.

“Mr. President, United Nations peacekeeping is clearly overstretched. We face operational stretch and, I would argue, political stretch too.”

—Alain Le Roy, Head of United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

Throughout this study, the Ford Institute compiled and analyzed data concerning the role of peacekeeping forces in African conflicts, the number of attacks in their respective areas of responsibility, and the factors that potentially influenced their ability to prevent violence against civilians. The findings suggest that, while UN peacekeeping operations have come under persistent criticism for their failure in protecting civilians from attack, peacekeepers have and can play a vital role under appropriate conditions in a variety of ways.

The lessons learned from this study begin with what may be regarded by many as commonplace observations: First, that any peacekeeping mission must be implemented under a clearly defined, Chapter VII mandate. Second, it is vital that the international community provide a designated force with the necessary resources and personnel to fulfill all aspects of its mandate. Too often, however, the evidence gathered in this study suggested that neither set of conditions are met. Third, the size of the force should take into consideration both the ratios of peacekeepers to displaced persons and to the geographic area of responsibility. Those missions deployed to countries whose ratios of displaced populations per peacekeeper were relatively small were far better able to protect civilians. Similarly, as demonstrated by the case of the DRC and Sudan, the simple size of a force is irrelevant if consideration of the density of the force compared to the geographic size of the zone of conflict is neglected. In the African conflicts studied, where the ratio of square kilometers per peacekeeper was relatively small, the force was better able to protect civilians and prevent attacks on camps. In essence, large conflict zones require proportionately sized forces, not simply larger ones. Events in Darfur illustrate the dire consequences for ignoring these simple rules.

More specifically, the findings of the study suggest that the international community should consider four general conditions that may increase the effectiveness of a peacekeeping force in protecting civilians. While they may be obvious to advocates of intervention, all are contested. We recognize that there are inevitable political and resource limitations set on any mission. Nonetheless, we offer them in the spirit of analysis rather than advocacy; on the assumption that once a force has been committed - its primary purpose is to protect vulnerable civilian populations in conflict zones, not simply to separate belligerents.

The composition and stability of a peacekeeping force. Across the conflicts studied, those UN forces in which the highest percentage of troops were drawn from the top five contributing countries were those most consistent with subsequent reduced attacks against civilians. In that sense, a greater degree of homogeneity mattered. Furthermore, peacekeeping forces whose composition among these five reflected a cross-regional balance were also consistent with reduced attacks. In this sense, heterogeneity proved advantageous. We can only surmise that the combination of local knowledge and possibly of alternative training may prove a more effective balance in enhancing security - an issue for further exploration. Finally the reduced turnover of the top five contributing countries to a peacekeeping force proved to be an important facet of enhanced security. Furthermore, the research conducted for this report shows that periods of low turnover often corresponded with periods of fewer attacks on civilians. Whether this is due to the importance of a stable command or greater local knowledge is, again, a matter for further review.

The importance of border security. Insecure borders are an endemic global problem, relating to illegal flows of people, arms and drugs. But in Africa the problem is perhaps more acute in facilitating the violence that tends to follow refugee flows across borders. There is little evidence that much strategic planning focuses on border security in peacekeeping missions. The recent violence in Chad and the DRC demonstrates that insufficient border security allows combatants to elude UN forces and to find safe havens from which to stage violent attacks upon civilians. This repetitious pattern begs the question as to whether UN peacekeeping missions should be provided with 'transnational mandates' or whether they should focus more of their energy on enhancing border security. Peacekeeping forces can potentially play a crucial role in preventing this violence from escalating if provided with the appropriate mandate and support.

The inclusion of DDR programs in a mission’s mandate. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are intrinsically related in sustaining a post-conflict environment. While criticisms of DDR programs are plentiful and often justified, the results of this study find a correlation in many cases between the implementation of a comprehensive DDR program and a decline in the level of violence against civilians. The case of Uganda demonstrates that these programs can be implemented successfully by national governments in the absence of a UN peacekeeping force. When present, however, such a force can play an intrinsic role in their formulation and implementation - and seemingly has done so effectively in the case of Sierra Leone. When the conditions on the ground allow for the implementation of DDR programs, they should be enacted in coordination with the peacekeeping force under its mandate for operations.

The following 16 key factors have been examined in analyzing the determinants of security at IDP and refugee camps:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Geo-coordinates</td>
<td>Latitude and longitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Type</td>
<td>Whether a camp is an official or an informal settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Camp Population</td>
<td>Number of inhabitants per year in a camp’s existence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Attack</td>
<td>Documented occasions of camps being attacked by armed contingents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Violence</td>
<td>Proximity of a camp to a conflict zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Peacekeeping Force (In Camp)</td>
<td>Presence, type, and number of peacekeeping forces within a given camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Peacekeeping Force (Near Camp)</td>
<td>Presence and number of peacekeeping forces near a given camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Government Force (In Camp)</td>
<td>Presence and number of government forces within a given camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Government Force (Near Camp)</td>
<td>Presence and number of government forces near a given camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 NSA Force (In Camp)</td>
<td>Non-state related forces within a given camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 NSA Force (Near Camp)</td>
<td>Non-state related forces near a given camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Self Protection</td>
<td>Protection initiatives provided by camp inhabitants, including neighborhood watch organizations and policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Screening Initiatives/Registration</td>
<td>Screening or registration of camp inhabitants upon entering a camp or prior to receiving aid distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Water</td>
<td>Proximity of a camp to areas with water, including natural springs and wells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Humanitarian Assistance: Water Provision</td>
<td>Goods and services provided to inhabitants of a given camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Border</td>
<td>Proximity of a camp to international border(s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“As I stand back and look at the vast challenges arrayed before us, it is clear that there is no let up in demand for UN peacekeeping. The range and breadth of mandated mission tasks continues to grow ever wider. At the same time, in Darfur, at least, we lack the resources required to get the job done. And we are being tasked to work where there is no peace to keep. It seems clear to me, therefore, that we will need to collectively consider how to address these demands more effectively, and, most importantly, the political and resource problems that lie at the root of the conflicts, and consider more deeply how we respond to the various inter-related aspects of conflict resolution; political, security, humanitarian, and early recovery.”

—Alain Le Roy, Head of United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations


The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help:

- Prevent and resolve violent international conflicts
- Promote post-conflict stability and development
- Increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide

The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.

The Graduate School of Public and International Affairs strives to prepare students to make substantive contributions to society through careers as managers, advisors, and policy analysts in government and nonprofit organizations in a multitude of geographic locations throughout the world.

To accomplish these goals, GSPIA teaches, conducts research and performs public service in the following areas:

- Management and administration of public and nonprofit agencies
- Growth and sustainable development of urban metropolitan regions throughout the world
- Economic and social development of newly independent and developing states
- Emerging dynamics that are shaping today’s international political economy
- Threats to and issues in international security

Through dedication to quality teaching that builds skills and commitments to the core values, GSPIA students work to improve public and nonprofit organizations that contribute to free and just societies in the United States and abroad.